We study how group size aects cooperation in an innitely repeated n-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. In each repetition of the game, groups of size n ≤ M are randomly and anonymously matched from a xed population of size M to play the n-player PD stage game. We provide conditions for which the contagious strategy (Kandori, 1992) sustains a social norm of cooperation among all M players. Our main nding is that if agents are suciently patient, a social norm of society-wide cooperation becomes easier to sustain under the contagious strategy as n → M . JEL Classication Nos: C72, C73, C78, Z13.
Introduction
What choice of group size maximizes (or minimizes) the possibility of achieving a social norm of cooperation in a nite population of self-interested strangers? This question would seem to be of considerable relevance to a wide variety of dierent settings involving the matching of strategic but essentially anonymous players, for example, the number of students assigned to each class, passenger seating congurations on airplanes or the number of jurors in a legal proceeding. In this paper we oer an answer to this question. Specically, we consider a population of players of xed size M . In every period, t = 1,2,...∞, players in this population are randomly matched to form groups of size n and play an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game with the members of their group. The total number of groups, M/n, is assumed to be an integer (i.e., M is a multiple of n).
The n = 2 person version of this environment has been previously studied by Kandori (1992) , who shows that a social norm of cooperation among anonymous, randomly matched players is sustainable under certain conditions on the game. Kandori further shows that a social norm of cooperation among strangers in the n = 2 case becomes more dicult to sustain as M gets large and the possibility vanishes in the limit as M → ∞. 1 By contrast, in this paper we x M and ask: for what value(s) of n ≥ 2 is a social norm of cooperation among strangers easiest to achieve? In other words, is there an optimal group size for maximizing the likelihood of cooperative outcomes?
Our answer is that under certain conditionsspecically if agents are suciently patient a social norm of cooperation among strangers, which is sustained by universal play of a contagious trigger strategy, becomes steadily easier to achieve as n gets larger, and becomes easiest to achieve when n = M . That is, we nd that cooperation can be easiest to sustain when the group size is as large as possible. This seemingly counterintuitive nding readily follows from the logic of the contagious trigger strategy that is used to support cooperation among randomly matched, noncommunicative and anonymous strangers. Intuitively, if agent are suciently patient, the costs of igniting a contagion toward mutual defection are greatest when the matching group size, n, equals the population size, M . On the other hand, once a defection has started in the community, the benets to slowing down the contagious process are also minimized in this same case where n = M . Therefore, the players' incentives to follow the contagious strategy are easiest to satisfy when the group size is as large as possible. However, we also nd that if agents are insuciently patient, then the relationship between the group size, n, and the ease with which a social norm of universal cooperation among strangers is sustained can be non-monotonic as n → M .
Our ndings serve to generalize Kandori's (1992) extension of the folk theorem for repeated games with random anonymous matchings to the multiple-player (n > 2) Prisoner's Dilemma game.
The n-player version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game is widely used to model a variety of social dilemmas including, e.g., the tragedy of the commons (Hardin (1968) ). In addition, we show that our monotonicity result holds more broadly in another two dierent settings. In the rst setting, 1 Ellison (1994) and Dal Bo (2007) provide further generalizations of how a social norm of cooperation may be sustained among anonymous and randomly matched players in 2-player Prisoner's Dilemma games. Xie and Lee (2012) and Duy et al. (2012) extend Kandori's result to a 2-player trust game. players in each group of size n are randomly paired to play the traditional 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma game but are able to observe information on the outcome of play by other pairs of players in their n-player matching group. In the second setting, the payo matrix of the n-player game is changed to reect the incentives provided in a binary public good game.
Some qualitative support for our main nding can be found in the experimental literature, where the consequences of group size for contributions to a public good have been studied by Isaac and Walker (1988) and Isaac et al. (1994) . Specically, they examine how groups of size 4, 10, 40 and 100 play a repeated public good game, which, as we show in section 5, can be interpreted as a version of an n-player Prisoner's Dilemma game, in the sense that the single period dominant strategy is to contribute zero of one's endowment to the public good, keeping all of the endowment for oneself.
2 One of their main ndings is that, holding the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good constant, an increase in the number of players, n, leads to no change or an increase (depending on the MPCR) in the mean percentage of each player's xed and common endowment that is contributed toward a public good, and this eect is strongest with group sizes of 40 and 100 in comparison with group sizes of 4 and 10. These ndings can be interpreted to imply that cooperation is weakly increasing with the group size, n.
2
The model
Consider a nite population of M players. Time is discrete, the horizon is innite and all players have a common period discount factor, δ ∈ [0, 1]. In each period, the M players are randomly and anonymously matched into m groups of size n ≤ M , with all matchings being equally likely, that is, we assume that M is a multiple of n with multiplier m. The randomly matched group members then simultaneously and without communication play an n-player Prisoner's Dilemma game where each player chooses a strategy from the set {C, D}, with C representing cooperation and D representing defection. Let i denote the number of members of the group choosing to cooperate (i.e., the number of cooperators) other than the representative player himself so that 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Let C i and D i denote the payos to cooperation and defection, respectively, when there are i cooperators. An n-player Prisoner's Dilemma game is dened by the following three assumptions regarding these payos:
Assumption A1 says that defection is always a dominant strategy. Assumption A2 says that 2 There are several important dierences between our setup and that of Issac and Walker that prevent a direct comparison: 1) the strategy space is continuous in Issac and Walker's public good game and not binary as in the n-player game that we study; 2) Issac and Walker's players are in xed matches of size n for all repetitions of the public good game whereas in our setup players are randomly matched into groups of size n in each repetition of the game, and 3) Issac and Walker study a nitely repeated game whereas we study an innitely repeated game.
payos are increasing with the number of cooperators. Finally, assumption A3 says that if all participants adopt the dominant strategy, the outcome is sub-optimal relative to the mutual cooperation outcome. These conditions are standard in the literature on n-person Prisoner's Dilemma games (See, e.g., Okda (1991, Assumption 2.1)). We further suppose that the payo matrix is symmetric for each player in the group and is as given in Table 1 .
number of cooperators in the group 0 1 2 We next provide a set of sucient conditions that sustains the contagious strategy as a sequential equilibrium when the group size is n. We rst introduce some notation. Let X t be the number of d-type players at time t. Dene A n = (a n ij ) to be an M × M transition probability matrix where a n ij = Pr(X t+1 = j|X t = i and all players follow the contagious strategy) given group size n. Dene B n = (b n ij ) as an M × M transition probability matrix where b n ij = Pr(X t+1 = j|X t = i and one d-type player deviates to playing C while all other players follow the contagious strategy) given group size n. Let H n = B n − A n , which indicates how the diusion of defection is delayed by the unilateral deviation of one of the d-type players. Dene Z n = (ρ n 0 ρ n 1 . . . ρ n n−1 ), where ρ n 0 , ρ n 1 , . . . , ρ n n−1 are M × 1 vectors such that the ith element of ρ n j is the conditional probability that a d-type player meets j c-type players in the group when there are i d-type players in the community given that the group size is n (i.e., Z n = (z n ij ) is an M × n matrix where z n ij = Pr(a d-type player meets j − 1 c-type players in his group in period t|X t = i) given a group size of n).
Dene e i as a 1 × M vector whose ith element is 1 and with zeros everywhere else. Finally, dene column vectors v n = (D 0 , D 1 , . . . , D n−1 ) T and u n = (C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C n−1 ) T , whose ith element is the payo for a player from choosing D and C respectively, given that there are i − 1 other players in the group who choose C.
Next we show that a one-shot deviation from the contagious strategy is unprotable after any history. On the equilibrium path, a one-shot deviation is unprotable if
The left hand side of (1) is the payo from cooperating forever and the right-hand side of (1) is the payo that the player earns if the player initiates a defection and defects forever afterward.
O the equilibrium path, following Kandori (1992) , we identify a sucient condition for a one-shot deviation to be unprotable under any consistent beliefs. Suppose there are k d-type players, where k = n, n + 1, . . . , M . 3 Then a one-shot deviation o the equilibrium path is unprotable if
The left hand side of (2) is the payo that a d-type player earns from playing D forever when there are k d-type players including the player himself, while the right hand side of (2) is what a d-type player receives when he deviates from the contagious strategy, playing C today and then reverting back to playing D forever after. Inequalities (1) and (2) can be manipulated into equilibrium conditions 1 and 2 in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium if the following two conditions are satised:
Equilibrium Condition 1:
The intuition behind equilibrium conditions 1 and 2 is similar to that for the n = 2 case studied by Kandori (1992) . When a player is on the equilibrium path, he has no incentive to deviate from cooperation when δ is suciently large. When a player is o the equilibrium path, he has no incentive to deviate from continued play of the contagious strategy if the extra payo from defection in the current period, v n − u n , is large enough. Using Lemma 1 we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Under uniformly random matching, the contagious strategy described above constitutes a sequential equilibrium strategy for any nite population size, M , if δ, C n−1 − D o , and v n − u n are suciently large.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Main Results
In this section we ask the following question: Fixing the population size M , which group size n maximizes the possibility of achieving a social norm of cooperation among strangers?
4 Although 3 Since the player under consideration is a d-type, there must be at least n d-type players in the community. 4 In Appendix B, we also ask how the answer to this question changes if instead of xing M , we vary both M and n but in such a way that the number of groups, m, is held constant.
we can characterize the equilibrium conditions for the contagious strategy, we cannot derive closedform solutions since the formulas for the elements of the transition matrix A and B become too complicated to derive for group sizes n > 2. 5 Therefore, in this section we switch to the use of numerical methods.
6
Furthermore, for greater tractability we focus on a simple symmetric specication for the payo parameters that satisfy assumptions A1-A3. Specically, we normalize C 0 = 0 and set
Under these assumptions, the payo matrix (Table 1 ) now takes on the specic form shown in Table 2 . We will consider the robustness of our ndings to a slightly dierent parameterization of the n-player PD game payo matrix later in section 5.
number of cooperators in the group 0 1 2 . . . Finally, we note that under our parameterization it may be easier to achieve full cooperation with a larger group size since the payo from cooperation, (n − 1)β, grows with the group size, n.
To properly correct for this dependency, we also normalize the payo matrix in such a way that the payo from full cooperation is xed and constant. Specically, we always set (n − 1)β = 1 for any n (i.e., we set β = 1/(n − 1)). Note that under this normalization, to satisfy assumption A3, we must have α < C n−1 = 1 for all n ≥ 2.
In order to examine the question raised above, we rst x M = 12 and examine changes in the two equilibrium conditions as the group size takes on the values n = 2, 3, 4, 6, 12. We nd that a common pattern emerges in this setting as n → M . We begin by presenting numerical results for a xed value of δ = 0.9. We will later consider cases where the value of δ is varied.
Equilibrium Condition 1
We rst examine the eect of increases in the group size, n, on equilibrium condition 1. Although we are mainly interested in the case where payos are normalized to eliminate the dependency on n, for the moment we keep payos for equilibrium condition 1 in their original unnormalized form (i.e., C n−1 = (n − 1)β), so that we can derive some intuition as to how the discounted summation of the probability of earning each payo outcome changes with the group size. Equilibrium condition 1 (as stated in Lemma 1) for various values of n is given as follows: n = 2: β ≥ 0.70492α + 0.29508(α + β); n = 3: 2β ≥ 0.75032α + 0.07575(α + β) + 0.17393(α + 2β); n = 4: 3β ≥ 0.78347α + 0.03034(α + β) + 0.05466(α + 2β) + 0.13153(α + 3β);
5 Kandori (1989) provides transition matrix formulas for the n = 2 case only.
6 The Mathematica program used for the numerical results is available upon request. n = 6: 5β ≥ 0.81002α + 0.00586(α + β) + 0.02928(α + 2β) + 0.03904(α + 3β) + 0.01464(α + 4β) + 0.10117(α + 5β); n = 12: 11β ≥ 0.9α + 0.1(α + 11β).
Several patterns regarding the discounted summation of probabilities for each payo should be noticed. First, the summation of the probabilities assigned to each payo on the right hand side of these inequalities is always 1, which is proved in Lemma 2 in the appendix. Second, the probability of earning D 0 = α, the rst term on the right hand side (i.e., the discounted summation of the probability of meeting no cooperators in the group once defection has started) is increasing with the group size n. Third, the probability of earning D n−1 = α + (n − 1)β, the last term on the right hand side (i.e., the discounted summation of the probability of meeting n − 1 cooperators in the group if the player chooses defection in the current period) is decreasing with the group size n. Finally, the discounted summation of the probability of earning D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D n−2 converges to 0 as n gets larger. These patterns are intuitive if we consider the extreme case where the group size is equal to the population size, i.e., n = M = 12. In that case, if a player chooses to defect his defection spreads to the entire population so that in the next period, he will never meet any cooperators in his group. Thus, only in the current period will the defecting player meet n − 1 cooperators and gain D n−1 . Now we impose the parametric normalization discussed above that eliminates the dependency of the equilibrium condition on n. In this case, equilibrium condition 1 for various values of n (and β = (n − 1) −1 ) is simplied as follows: 7 n = 2: α ≤ 0.705, for β = 1; n = 3: α ≤ 0.788, for β = 1/2; n = 4: α ≤ 0.823, for β = 1/3; n = 6: α ≤ 0.85, for β = 1/5; n = 12: α ≤ 0.9, for β = 1/11.
We observe that equilibrium condition 1 becomes monotonically less restrictive as the group size n becomes larger. Intuitively, with a larger group size, an initial defection spreads to more innocent (c-type) players. Furthermore, via the random re-matching each period, defection spreads to the entire population of M players much faster since there are fewer groups given the xed population size, M , and a larger group size, n. These two eects together imply that the contagious process is faster with a larger group size n and thus the payo from starting a defection is reduced, making the condition on the equilibrium path easier to satisfy. Note that a slightly dierent normalization,
More generally, given a group of size n, we can write equilibrium condition 1 as:
where p n j ≡ (1 − δ)e 1 (I − δA n ) −1 ρ n j denotes the discounted summation of the probability of meeting j cooperators (c-types) in a group of size n once a player has initiated a defection. From this 7 Notice that the regulative condition α < 1 is always satised for n ≥ 2.
condition we can derive a more sucient condition:
Since we have already shown that n−1 j=0 p n j = 1 in Lemma 2, inequality (3) above can be simplied to:
Finally, imposing the normalization that β = (n − 1) −1 , we have
Proposition 1 If p n 0 is increasing in n, then Condition (4) (Equilibrium condition 1) is monotonically less restrictive as the group size n increases.
Equilibrium Condition 2
We next examine the eects of increases in the group size, n, on equilibrium condition 2. Given our payo specication that D i −C i = α for i = 0, 1, . . . , n−1, the left hand side of equilibrium condition 2, the extra payo from defection, is equal to α. The right hand side of equilibrium condition 2, the payo for a d-type player from slowing down the contagious process, achieves its highest value when the number of d-type players are at a minimum, i.e., when k = n. Thus it is sucient to compare equilibrium condition 2 at k = n for dierent group sizes, n = 2, 3, 4, 6, 12. Similar to equilibrium condition 1, we rst present equilibrium condition 2 with the original payo parameters and then we impose our normalization later. Equilibrium condition 2 (as stated in Lemma 1) for various values of n is given as follows: k = n = 2: α ≥ −0.29077α + 0.29077(α + β); k = n = 3: α ≥ −0.19856α + 0.09489(α + β) + 0.10367(α + 2β); k = n = 4: α ≥ −0.18757α + 0.12632(α + β) + 0.05126(α + 2β) + 0.00998(α + 3β); k = n = 6: α ≥ −0.01154α + 0.00190(α + β) + 0.00506(α + 2β) + 0.00379(α + 3β) + 0.00076(α + 4β) + 0.00003(α + 5β); k = n = 12: α ≥ 0.
Several patterns are again noticeable. First, the summation of the probabilities associated with each payo D i is always 0, which is proved in Lemma 2 in the appendix. Second, the probability of earning D 0 = α on the right hand side (i.e., the discounted summation of the probability of meeting no cooperators in the group) is negative (0 in the 12-person PD), and the other probabilities of earning D i = α + iβ on the right hand side (i.e., the discounted summation of the probability of meeting i cooperators in the group) are positive (0 in the 12-person PD). This shows that the d-type player's deviation from the contagious strategy in the current period decreases the d-type player's probability of meeting no c-type players in the group in future periods, and increases the probabilities of meeting any positive number of c-type players in the group in the future. Furthermore, the decrease in the probability of meeting no c-type players is the summation of the increase in the probabilities of meeting any positive number of c-type players. Finally, the extent of the change in the probabilities is decreasing as the group size, n, becomes larger. It is sucient to see this point from the decrease in the probability of meeting no c-type players, that is, the absolute value of the rst probability on the right hand side of earning D 0 = α is decreasing as n gets larger. In the case of k = n = M = 12, when the player under consideration is a d-type player, all the other players in the population are also d-type players. Therefore, there is no eect working to slow down the contagious process if this d-type player chooses to deviate from the contagious strategy by choosing cooperation.
Now again we impose the normalization condition that β = (n − 1) −1 . Doing so yields the following versions of equilibrium condition 2 for the various group sizes n: n = 2: α ≥ 0.291, for β = 1; n = 3: α ≥ 0.151, for β = 1/2; n = 4: α ≥ 0.086, for β = 1/3; n = 6: α ≥ 0.005, for β = 1/5; n = 12: α ≥ 0.
From the above results, equilibrium condition 2 becomes less restrictive with a larger group size, n. Intuitively, it is also due to the faster contagious process associated with a larger group size. When the speed of contagion is faster, the eect for a single d-type player to slow down the contagious process becomes smaller. So the d-type player has less of an incentive to deviate from the contagious strategy o the equilibrium path by reverting back to playing cooperation again.
More generally, given a group of size n, we can write equilibrium condition 2 as:
where q n j ≡ δe n H n (I −δA n ) −1 ρ n j denotes the change in the discounted summation of the probability of meeting j c-type players in the group when the d-type player reverts back to playing cooperation instead of defection given that the group size is n and there are k = n d-type players in the population. If q n j > 0 for j = 1, . . . , n − 1, then we can derive a more sucient condition:
Given that n−1 j=0 q n j = 0 as shown in Lemma 2, inequality (5) can be simplied to:
Imposing the normalization (n − 1)β = 1, we have
Proposition 2 If q n 0 < 0, q n j > 0 for j = 1, . . . , n − 1, and |q n 0 | is decreasing in n, then Condition (6) (Equilibrium condition 2) is monotonically less restrictive as the group size n increases.
Numerical Findings for Dierent Values of δ
Propositions 1-2 require restrictions on p n 0 and |q n 0 | so that a set of more sucient equilibrium conditions for the contagious strategy to sustain a social norm of cooperation among strangers becomes monotonically less restrictive as the group size n increases. We next ask whether these conditions hold, i.e., whether p n 0 is increasing in n and whether |q n 0 | is decreasing in n. Notice rst that p n 0 = (1 − δ)e 1 (I − δA n ) −1 ρ n 0 and q n 0 = δe n H n (I − δA n ) −1 ρ n 0 are both functions of δ and n. (Implicitly they are also functions of M since the transition probability matrix A n and B n also depend on M ). Therefore, we compute p n 0 and q n 0 for dierent group sizes, n, and for dierent discount factors, δ, all under a xed M = 12. The results of these numerical calculations are shown in Table 3 . The cells shown in boldface are those that guarantee the existence of the contagious equilibrium. Our numerical exercises on p n 0 (top half of Table 3 ) illustrate some interesting results. Recall that p n 0 is the discounted summation of the probability of meeting zero c-type players in the group in all future periods once the player initiates a defection in the current period. Given any group size n, Table 3 reveals that p n 0 increases with δ. (p n 0 = 0 for δ = 0 and p n 0 = 1 for δ = 1.) Intuitively, this pattern is due to the feature of the contagious equilibrium defection will spread to the entire population once defection is initiated, and it takes some time for a defection to spread. Therefore, when the player cares more about the future, the discounted summation of the probability of meeting zero c-type player becomes larger.
Next we ask: given a xed δ, how does p n 0 change with increases in the group size n? The results reported in Table 3 suggest that the answer depends on δ. When δ is small, p n 0 follows a non-monotonic pattern; it decreases with n rst and then increases with n, reaching p n 0 = δ when n = M . However, when δ is large enough (in our numerical example when δ ≥ 0.5), p n 0 is monotonically increasing as the group size n increases. We next consider the numerical results for q n 0 = δe n H n (I − δA n ) −1 ρ n 0 , which is the decrease in the discounted summation of the probability of meeting zero c-type players in the group when the d-type player reverts back to playing cooperation instead of defection given that the group size is n and there are k = n d-type players. Again we see (in the bottom half of Table 3 ) that q n 0 is increasing in δ given a certain group size. When δ is large enough (δ greater than 0.9 in Table 3 ), |q n 0 | is monotonically decreasing as the group size n increases. Therefore, the equilibrium condition o the equilibrium path becomes less restrictive as n increases. 8
Given the numerical results in Table 3 , we conjecture that there exists a threshold value for the discount factor,δ such that, for any δ >δ, p n 0 is monotonically increasing in n and |q n 0 | is monotonically decreasing in n. To verify this hypothesis, we plot p n 0 and q n 0 as continuous functions of δ in Figure 1 . Indeed, we can see that when δ > .35 (approximately) p n 0 is increasing in n. When δ > 0.8 (approximately), |q n 0 | is decreasing in n. (For n = 12, p n 0 = δ and |q n 0 | = 0 for any δ.) In order to check whether this (partial) monotonicity result is only true for p n 0 and |q n 0 | or it also applies to the original equilibrium conditions, we performed a similar exercise using the original equilibrium conditions 1 and 2. Recall that equilibrium condition 1 is:
8 In all of the cases reported in Table 3 , it is always the case that q n 0 < 0 and q n j > 0 for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. Table 4 : Numerical Results on p n and q n for Dierent n and δ (M = 12) Table 4 provides numerical results on p n and q n for dierent values of δ and n. In all cases, the contagious equilibrium always exists, i.e., the numerical value in each cell for p n is always larger than the value in the corresponding cell for q n . Thus by choosing α between q n and p n both equilibrium conditions 1 and 2 always hold. We observe that the result that cooperation is monotonically easier to sustain as n increases appears to hold more strongly under these original equilibrium conditions. That is, we nd that p n is monotonically increasing in n given any δ, and q n is monotonically decreasing in n if δ is suciently large enough (greater than 0.5). Thus, the cuto value for the discount factorδ is smaller when we use the original equilibrium conditions. This observation is veried in Figure 2 . Summarizing, our main nding is that, for a xed population M and for δ suciently high, the conditions under which the contagious strategy sustains play of the cooperative strategy in an nplayer Prisoner's Dilemma game by all anonymously and randomly matched players in each period is monotonically more easily satised as the group size, n → M .
4
Group Size and Information Sharing
In this section we establish an equivalence result between the n-player PD game and the more traditional 2-player PD game. In the rst setting, a nite population of size M is randomly assigned into groups of size n in each period and then each group plays an n-person PD game, just as described in the previous sections. In the second setting, the nite population of size M is randomly assigned into groups of size n in a rst-round matching, and then the n players in each group are further randomly paired with each other in a second-round matching prior to playing the 2-person PD game as shown in Table 5 , where rows represent the representative player's choice and columns represent the opponent player's choice.
9 We will show that there exists an equivalence between these two settings when information on the outcome of play is shared between the n players who are matched in the rst round of the second setting. Therefore, under this information sharing assumption, the existence and monotonicity results shown in the previous sections should extend directly to the 9 For simplicity, we assume that n is an even number.
second setting involving the 2-player PD game. 
Payo Equivalence
Suppose that in the second setting there are i cooperators in the group of size n other than the (representative) player himself. Then the player's expected payo from choosing C is
The expected payo for the player from choosing D is
Compared with the payos for the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma as shown in Table 2 , we nd that the player's (expected) payos in this 2-person PD game are exactly the same as for the n-player PD game provided that the latter game has the same number of cooperators 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 in the group of size n.
Strategy Equivalence
In the case of the 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, if players' strategies depend only on their own personal histories, then the strategy space will be dierent relative to the n-person PD game, where it is possible to condition behavior on the outcome of interactions with n − 1 other players.
However, if we allow players in the 2-person game to observe other pairs' payo outcomes in the matching group of size n, and we allow all players' strategies to depend on the entire history of such payo information, then we can easily establish a strategy equivalence between the two dierent settings as well.
Assume that in the second setting, in each period the players in each group of size n can not only observe the outcome of their own pair, but can also observe the outcome of other pairs in their n-player group. However, they are not able to observe the outcome of any pair outside of their n-player group. Furthermore, let us revise the contagious strategy in the second setting as follows:
Dene a player as a c-type if in all previous repetitions of the game this player and all of other n − 1 group members in all previous periods have never chosen D, i.e., the outcome where all pairs this player can observe in every previous period has been (C, C) . Otherwise, the player is a d-type player. The contagious strategy is dened in the same manner as before: A player chooses C if he is c-type and chooses D if he is d-type.
By allowing the player to observe the outcome of other pairs in the same n-player group and to allow the contagious strategy to depend on the outcome of all pairs the player can observe, it is straightforward that the contagious process in the second setting is same as in the rst setting.
Therefore, the results in the rst setting will carry over to the second setting.
The equivalence results between the rst and second settings have an interesting implication.
In the second setting we rst randomly assign players into groups of size n, and then further pair players in each group randomly. It is easy to see that this procedure still produces uniform random matching for each pair. Thus the monotonicity result obtained previously implies that in the uniform random matching game involving play of the 2-person PD game, it is easier to sustain a contagious equilibrium if players are allowed to observe more information on other players' outcomes. Kandori (1992) has a similar result for the case of full information, where he shows that cooperation is much easier to sustain when all M players can observe outcomes experienced by all other players, compared to the case where players can only observe their own private history. This is analogous to the comparison of groups of size 2 with groups of size M in our setting. Our monotonicity result thus establishes a connection between private information and full (population-wide) information,
by showing that cooperation can be monotonically easier to sustain when partial information on the outcome of play of other community members is steadily increased (i.e., when the group size n increases gradually from 2 to M ).
An Application to a Public Goods Game
In this section we show that with a slightly dierent normalization of the payo matrix, the nperson Prisoner's Dilemma game can be re-interpreted as a public goods game so that our previous monotonicity result continues to hold in this public goods game version of the stage game.
As before, we assume a population of M players, who are anonymously and randomly assigned to groups of size n in each period to play an n-player public goods game. Here we study a binary choice version of the classic public good game (Issac and Walker (1988) ) where each player is endowed with a single token and must decide whether or not to invest that token in his own privately held account or in a public account. Each token invested in the public account yields a payo of µ for each group member. A token invested in the private account yields an additional payo of γ, but only to the player associated with that private account. Table 6 represents the payo matrix for the player from choosing to invest in the public account (C ) or in the private account (D) given the number of other contributors to the public account in the group of size n. The standard public good game setup has µ > 0 and γ > 0, so that non-contribution to the public good is always a dominant strategy in the one-shot, n-player game, and nally that γ + µ < nµ, which implies that the social optimum is achieved when all n players contribute to the public good. Notice that these restrictions also satisfy assumptions A1-A3, as dened in Section 2 for an n-player Prisoner's Dilemma game.
When this public goods game serves as the stage game played by a population of M players, who are randomly divided up into groups of size n in every period, the sucient conditions to sustain number of contributors in the group 0 1 2 . . . 
while o the equilibrium path we require that:
Then with the normalization that µ = 1/n, equilibrium condition 1 becomes γ ≤p n and equilibrium condition 2 becomes γ ≥q n .
Based on the previous numerical results (Table 4) , it is easy to show that the monotonicity pattern still holds for the public goods game when δ is suciently large, with the threshold value forδ slightly increased.
Conclusions
We have examined the eect of group size, n, on the equilibrium conditions needed to sustain cooperation via the contagious strategy as a sequential equilibrium in repeated play of an n-player Prisoner's Dilemma game given a nite population of players of size M ≥ n and random and anonymous matching of players in each repetition of the game. We nd that, if agents are suciently patient, the equilibrium conditions, both on the equilibrium path and o the equilibrium path, become less restrictive, and thus more easily satised as the group size n → M . This result arises from the faster speed with which a contagious wave of defections can occur as the group size becomes larger. We show that our results continue to hold in settings where players have information about the outcomes of play in their n-player matching group but are randomly paired to play the classic 2-person prisoner's dilemma game or where the payo matrix of the n-player game is altered slightly to capture the incentive structure of the standard public goods game.
Our ndings serve to highlight the implications of Kandori's (1992) idea that a social norm of cooperative behavior among anonymous strangers can be policed by community-wide enforcement.
Specically, communitywide enforcement becomes easier to sustain as the speed with which information travels becomes faster, which is here proxied by increases in the group size, n. Centralized communication or monitoring mechanisms might also perform the same role played by larger group sizes in easing the conditions under which a social norm of cooperation is sustained in a large population of players. Finally, we noted that our result that cooperation becomes easier to sustain in larger group sizes nds some qualitative support in the experimental work of Isaac et al. who studied the eect of group size on contributions to public goods, and found that, holding the marginal per capita return to the public good constant, larger groups contributed more to a public good than did smaller groups. We leave a more precise experimental test of variations in group size and the contagious strategy mechanism described in this paper to future research.
Appendix A
We rst show that the equilibrium conditions in Lemma 1 are equivalent to the equilibrium conditions provided by Kandori (1992) when the group size n = 2 . Translating our notation to that used by Kandori (1992) , C n−1 = 1, u n = (−l, 1) T , v n = (0, 1 + g) T , Z n = (i M − ρ ρ) (ρ = 1 M −1 (M − 1, M − 2, . . . , 1, 0) T , in which the ith element of ρ is the conditional probability that a d-type player meets a c-type when there are i d-types, and i M is a 1 × M vector with all elements equal to 1), A n = A, B n = B, H n = H. Thus condition 1, equation 1 can be written as:
1 ≥ (1 − δ)e 1 (I − δA) −1 (i M − ρ ρ) 0 1 + g = (1 − δ)e 1 (I − δA) −1 ρ(1 + g), which is the same as equilibrium condition 1 in Kandori (1992) . Condition 2, equation 2 can be written as
which is the same as equilibrium condition 2 in Kandori (1992) .
Lemma 2 Dene p n j ≡ (1 − δ)e 1 (I − δA n ) −1 ρ n j and q n j ≡ δe n H n (I − δA n ) −1 ρ n j (j = 0, . . . , n − 1), then n−1 j=0 p n j = 1 and n−1 j=0 q n j = 0.
Proof. By denition, p n j denotes the discounted summation of the probability of meeting j c-type players in the group once a defection has started when the group size is n, and q n j denotes the change in the discounted summation of the probability of meeting j c-type players in the group when the d-type player reverts back to playing cooperation instead of defection given that the group size is n and there are k = n d-type players. Notice that by denition the summation of the elements in each row of matrix Z n , A n , and B n is always equal to 1. Denote i k as a 1 × k vector with all elements equal to 1. Thus Z n i n = i M , A t n i M = i M and B t n i M = i M for any group size n and t = 0, 1, . . . , ∞.
Therefore we have n−1 j=0 p n j = (1 − δ)e 1 (I − δA n ) −1 Z n i n = (1 − δ)e 1 (I − δA n ) −1 i M = (1 − δ) ∞ t=0 δ t e 1 A t n i M = 1, n−1 j=0 q n j = e n H n (I − δA n ) −1 Z n i n = e n H n (I − δA n ) −1 i M = ∞ t=0 δ t e n (B n − A n )A t n i M = 0.
Proof. [Theorem 1]
We rst show that lim δ→1 (I − δA n ) −1 ρ n j < ∞ for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. (Therefore, lim δ→1 p n j = 0 for j = 1, . . . , n − 1 and lim δ→1 p n 0 = 1.) The proof is similar as in Kandori's (1992) proof for Theorem 1. Since X t = M is the absorbing state and the M th element of ρ n j is zero for j = 1, . . . , n − 1, whereÃ n is a matrix obtained by replacing the last column of A n by zeros. Given this, we have only to show the existence of (I −Ã n ) −1 . Since the number of d-types never declines,Ã n is uppertriangular and so is (I −Ã n ). The determinant of an upper-triangular matrix is the products of its diagonal elements, which are all strictly positive for (I −Ã n ). Therefore, lim δ→1 p n j = lim δ→1 (1 − δ)e 1 (I − δA n ) −1 ρ n j → 0 and q n j = δe n H n (I − δA n ) −1 ρ n j is nite for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. Now the r.h.s. of equilibrium condition 1, (1 − δ)e 1 (I − δA n ) −1 Z n v n = p Similarly, the r.h.s. of equilibrium condition 2, δe n H n (I − δA n ) −1 Z n v n = q n o D o + n−1 j=1 q n j D j , is nite because n−1 j=0 q n j = 0 and so q n o = − n−1 j=1 q n j . Therefore, equilibrium condition 2 is satised when v n − u n is suciently large.
with increases in the group size, n.
